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The United Nations Compensation 
Commission: Mass Reparations Apotheosis 
BY GREGORY TOWNSEND* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
I am honored to contribute to this 40th anniversary symposium 
issue of the Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law 
Review. For the 1995–1996 academic school year in the last 
millennium, the outgoing editorial board selected me to serve as Editor-
in-Chief of volume 18 of the (then) Loyola of Los Angeles International 
and Comparative Law Journal.
1
 Having had, with great fortune, the ‘red 
pen’ passed to me, I spent the next year toiling with, among other 
things, correcting the torturous syntax of several articles, learning 
Christensen copyediting symbols (and deciphering others’ use of them),
2
 
and mollifying authors with belated edits to their already finalized 
galley proofs. Despite these rites of passage experienced by all review 
staff, in retrospect, what I remember and cherish most is the 
camaraderie and support of my fellow students (including on long, 
weekend, pizza-fueled ‘production days’), our engaging, often heated, 
and erudite legal and editorial debates, and our shared pride in finally 
putting an issue ‘to bed.’ Flush with these memories of my heady 
learning experience working on a journal and twenty years spent since 
then working on accountability for United Nations institutions, it was an 
easy decision to respond in the affirmative when asked to contribute a 
paper to this symposium. 
After leaving Loyola Law in 1996, and with the help of several 
mentors, including Professor Laurie Levenson, I entered the criminal 
 
 * Gregory Townsend (J.D. Loyola Law School 1996; D.E.S. IUHEI, Université de 
Genève 1993; M.A.L.D. Fletcher School, Tufts University 1992; B.A. UCLA 1988) is currently 
employed as a Lecturer in International Law at The Hague University and Lecturer in Law for 
UCLA School of Law, based in The Hague. He served as Editor-in-Chief of the Loyola Los 
Angeles International & Comparative Law Review in 1995-96. 
 1. See About the Review, LOY. L. SCH. L.A., INT’L & COMP. L. REV., 
https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/ilr/about.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
 2. See JOE CHRISTENSEN INC., http://www.christensen.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
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law field. In 1998, I left the excellent training grounds of the Los 
Angeles Public Defender’s Office when I received a job offer (on 
thermal fax paper) from the United Nations (“UN”) International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania, where I 
grabbed the opportunity and spent more than seven years working on 
genocide cases and prosecuting some notable trials. This experience had 
a lasting impact on me, both professionally and personally. One UN job 
in international criminal law led to another, including going from 
Arusha to Kosovo to Sierra Leone to The Hague. In 2018, twenty years 
after ‘temporarily’ joining the UN, I completed my most recent UN 
contract at my sixth international criminal jurisdiction, the UN 
International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals. My practice 
today remains focused on international criminal law and teaching the 
subject. 
While studying in Geneva in 1992, my previous interest in public 
international law was sparked by a guest lecture on the topic of the UN 
Compensation Commission (“UNCC”). This lecture by John R. Crook, 
Counselor for Legal Affairs at the U.S. Mission in Geneva and an early 
U.S. proponent of the UNCC, directly led to my writing of my 
comment. 
My graduation from Loyola Law in 1996 serendipitously 
coincided with the resurgence of international criminal law and, lucky 
for me, an upturn in the number of UN jobs in this niche area. Today, 
however, the job market is shrinking, internationalism is retrenching, 
and prospects waning that the international community will close gaps 
in impunity in recent armed conflicts. 
In Part II of this paper, I provide a succinct overview of my less-
succinct, fifty-five page, 1995 comment on the UNCC.
3
 In Part III, I 
give an update on the UNCC since the passage of twenty-four years 
since publication of my comment. In Part IV, I give a pithy and positive 
assessment of the UNCC in its twenty-seventh year of what appears 
likely to be a thirty year life span, noting its legal innovations and 
accomplishments. Finally, in Part V, I conclude by remarking that the 
success of the UNCC is partially attributable to the relative consensus 
within the United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) that 
characterized the years of the UNCC’s establishment and operation in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. 
 
 3. See generally Gregory Townsend, Comment, The Iraq Claims Process: A Progress 
Report on the United Nations Compensation Commission & U.S. Remedies, 17 LOY. L.A. INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 973 (1995). 
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In this immediate post-Cold War era, the permanent members of 
the UNSC were in accord on questions of international justice.
4
 It was 
this same period of consensus that saw the UNSC establish the UN 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in 1993 and 
the UN International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 1994, and the 
international community adopt the Rome Statute establishing the 
International Criminal Court in 1998.
5
 I mention this not only out of a 
sense of nostalgia but to put the UNCC in this political and temporal 
context for the purpose of assessing it today. 
II. OVERVIEW OF 1995 COMMENT 
While recently re-reading my 1995 comment, what first struck me 
is that the viability of the UNCC really hung in the balance for the first 
phase of its existence. Today, in the twilight of the UNCC, we can look 
back, take its existence for granted, and fail to appreciate the breadth 
and size of its accomplishments as the “largest-ever war reparation 
exercise.”
6
 In 1995, this was far from evident. The UNCC’s first 
Executive Secretary conceded that the institution constituted “an 
unprecedented experiment in international practice” and commentators 
debated its “legitimacy.”
7
 Critics saw the UNCC as “doomed” because 
it would never garner sufficient funds to compensate the victims of 
Iraq’s invasion,
8
 occupation, and damage to Kuwait in 1990 and the 
First Gulf War that followed in 1991
9
 The “UNCC’s sine qua non was 
[always] the availability of money to pay claims.”
10
 Labeled 
“retributive,” “disturbing” by those contending that the UNSC had 
violated Iraqi sovereignty, and “unduly imposing of” the process upon a 
 
 4. See generally DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, UN Documentation: International 
Law, https://research.un.org/en/docs/law/courts (last visited Mar. 14, 2019).  
 5. Id. 
 6. Veijo Heiskanen, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in 296 RECUEIL DES 
COURS 259, 268 (2002). 
 7. Carlos Alzamora, The UN Compensation Commission: An Overview, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 3 (Richard B. Lillich 
ed., 1995); David D. Caron, The UNCC and the Search for Practical Justice, in THE UNITED 
NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 367 (Richard B. 
Lillich ed., 1995). 
 8. Alan D. Meltzer, The United Nations Compensation Commission, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 
532, 533 (1996) (reviewing THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Richard B. 
Lillich ed., 1995) and noting that “the UNCC’s ultimate legacy remains uncertain, as it continues 
to lack sufficient funding to pay most claim awards”). 
 9. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 975.   
 10. Jeremy Carver, Introduction: International Claims Litigation II: A Case Study on the 
UNCC, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 325, 326 (2005). 
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vanquished Iraq,
11
 the UNCC appeared to be in jeopardy. The UNCC 
risked the political tides turning, being one UNSC vote away from 
dissolution,
12
 and unable ‘“to produce anything except jobs for 
international bureaucrats.’”
13
 The UNSC, however, was consistent from 
the start on the liability of Iraq pursuant to international law for any 
loss, damage or injury arising in regard to Kuwait.
14
 As time would tell, 
the UNCC eventually turned a corner when Iraq finally started to 
replenish its compensation fund. This replenishing of the UNCC’s 
compensation fund put it in a position to process an unprecedented 
volume of claims settlements, both in terms of the number of claims and 
the overall monetary value of the compensation claims payments. 
My comment described the UNCC’s legal nature and structure, 
stating that the UNCC’s mandate was not judicial or adjudicatory but 
rather administrative, fact-finding, and political.
15
 Those establishing the 
UNCC modeled it on U.S. mass tort claims administration.
16
 It is 
noteworthy that the UNCC served as a subsidiary organ of the UNSC, 
and its Governing Council mirrored the UNSC’s (partially rotating) 
membership.
17
 In retrospect, this structure ensured that the UNCC had 
strong political support, which it retains to this day. 
As of 2019, we know the UNCC “has paid out $48.1 billion” in 
claims compensation.
18
 This payout is a staggering figure, even more so 
as it is in stark contrast to the situation in 1994, when the UNCC did not 
have on hand sufficient funds, $200 million, to compensate even its first 
claimants, victims forced to depart Iraq or Kuwait.
19
 These victims 
claimed a fixed sum between $2,500 and $8,000.
20
 In 1995, the UNCC 
 
 11. See Townsend, supra note 3, at 975.   
 12. See id. at 979; see also Michael Raboin, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and 
Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 332-33 (2005) (noting that 
for those at the UNCC, “[o]ne of our constant fears was that the Security Council would 
discontinue the UNCC for political reasons before we could process all the claims”).   
 13. Townsend, supra note 3, at 1025.   
 14. See S.C. Res. 687, ¶ 16 (Apr. 3, 1991). 
 15. Townsend, supra note 3, at 978.   
 16. Id. at 986. 
 17. See id. at 982; see also Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Danio Campanelli, The 
United Nations Compensation Commission: Time for Assessment?, in FRIEDEN IN FREIHEIT: 
FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 3, 7 (Andreas Fischer-Lescano, et al eds., 2008). Iraq has not been elected as a 
non-permanent member of the UNSC since 1974-1975. 
 18. Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation 
Commission Pays Out US $100 Million, U.N. Press Release PR/2019/1 (Jan 18, 2019) 
[hereinafter Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1]. 
 19. Townsend, supra note 3, at 988, 1005. 
 20. Id. 
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also could not pay some of those making claims for personal injury and 
death of family members.
21
 As of 1995, the UNCC’s claim settlement 
process was just getting underway for the various categories of claims 
and deadlines for submission of some claims were still pending. 
My 1995 comment indicated that the lack of Iraqi compliance with 
UNSC resolutions stymied the UNCC claims process and proposed 
possible solutions.
22
 Most curious, in retrospect, is that some of the then, 
more far-fetched solutions played out to some extent in future years. 
The UNSC waited out a change in the Iraqi government,
23
 and the 
UNSC enacted more drastic sanctions in the years following the 
change,
24
 though largely in relation to purported biological weapons and 
other so-called weapons of mass destruction.
25
 While the UNSC did not 
take control of Iraqi oil production,
26
 U.S. military action achieved 
“regime change” without UN Charter Chapter 7 authorization in the 
Second Gulf War from 2003. Successor Iraqi governments could do 
little but comply with the UNSC’s previous imposition of liability for 
compensation stemming from the 1990–1991 invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait.
27
 
The UNCC remains one of a kind. In 1995, I concluded that the 
UNCC would “prove itself a successful and innovative international 
institution” once Iraq made available funding from its oil sales.
28
 I still 
agree with that proposition today, but what I grossly under estimated 
was the duration of the international political impasse in Iraq. What I 
guessed to be potentially two years was many more.
29
 I suspect this 
under estimate was attributable both to the impatience of my youth and 
perhaps the tenacity of Saddam Hussein’s regime to remain in power, 
blocking the UNCC from making progress on the bigger claims. 
III. UPDATE SINCE 1995 
Between 1991 (when established), 1995 (the year of publication of 
my “progress report” comment) and today, in 2019, the UNCC has 
made tremendous progress. Summing up the UNCC by its milestones 
 
 21. Id. at 990. 
 22. Id. at 1011, 1019. 
 23. Id. at 1020. 
 24. Id. at 1021. 
 25. See id. at 1016, 1026. 
 26. See id. at 1022-23. 
 27. See id. at 976. 
 28. Id. at 1026. 
 29. Id. at 1025-26. 
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and figures over the course of its nearly twenty-seven years of 
existence, its most recent press release of January 18, 2019 reported: 
The Commission received approximately 2.7 million claims and 
concluded its review of all claims in 2005. Approximately $52.4 
billion was awarded to over 100 Governments and international 
organizations for distribution to 1.5 million claims in all claim 
categories … [as of January 18, 2019] the Commission has paid out 
$48.1 billion, leaving approximately $4.3 billion remaining to be 
paid to the only claim with an outstanding award balance. This 
category E claim was submitted by the Government of the State of 
Kuwait on behalf of the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation and awarded 
$14.7 billion in 2000 for oil production and sales losses as a result of 
damages to Kuwait’s oil field assets. It represents the largest award 
by the Commission.
30
 
The UNCC anticipates paying out the $4.3 billion balance of this 
one, last remaining claim to the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation by the 
end of 2021. The year 2021 will represent the UNCC’s thirtieth year of 
operation, having been established by UNSC Resolution 687 (the 
ceasefire resolution) of April 3, 1991.
31
 It seems unlikely that anyone 
working for the UNSC would have anticipated that the UNCC would 
last that long, let alone that it would decide 2.7 million claims, granting 
1.5 million, and paying out more than $52 billion. This is remarkable 
and exceeds expectations, especially considering that the Security 
Council at first set up the UNCC to have the “ultimate objective . . . to 
provide some rough sense of justice for the little guy,” namely 
claimants in “small” claims categories.
32
 
The UNCC was speedy in processing most claims.
33
 One panel 
finished category “B” claims in 1995, category “A” in 1996,
34
 and 
 
 30. Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1, supra note 18. 
 31. S.C. Res. 687, supra note 14, ¶ 6. 
 32. Nicholas C. Ulmer, Claimant’s Expectations from the United Nations Compensation 
Commission, 15 J. INT’L ARB. 7 (1998). 
 33. See generally Francis E. McGovern, Dispute System Design: The United Nations 
Compensation Commission, in WAR REPARATIONS AND THE UN COMPENSATION COMMISSION: 
DESIGNING COMPENSATION AFTER CONFLICT 29, 30 (Timothy J. Feighery, et. al., eds., 2015) 
[hereinafter WAR REPARATIONS] (noting that the UNCC had completed the entire claim review 
process by June 2005, including after late-filed claims); see also Jason Scott Palmer, The 
Palestinian “Late Claims” Program: Remedying Mistakes in Mass Claims Processing Without 
Compounding the Error, in WAR REPARATIONS 103, 133 (discussing the so-called “late” claims 
before the UNCC and concluding that future claims processes should anticipate claims after the 
deadlines from deserving claimants). 
 34. See generally Iñigo Salvador-Crespo, Making Good for Forced Exodus: Compensation 
for Departure from Iraq or Kuwait—Claims of Individuals: “A” Claims, in WAR REPARATIONS, 
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category “C” in 1999.
35
 Thus, the UNCC paid out these three “urgent” 
categories first, which represent the numerical bulk of the claims within 
eight years of the armed conflict. 
A. Funds for Compensation 
UNSC Resolution 705 (1991) fixed the percentage of Iraqi oil 
proceeds that fund compensation to not exceed 30% (based on previous 
Iraqi domestic military spending).
36
 From 1991–1996 however, the 
UNCC did not secure the billions of dollars needed to fund this 
ambitious undertaking in mass claims compensation.
37
 The UNSC’s 
credibility and the UNCC’s viability were precariously on the line. It 
seemed possible that the UNCC would award only pennies on the 
dollar, if any compensation at all, to those suffering losses.
38
 “No one 
predicted that Iraq would not export any oil for five years, creating 
repeated funding crises” for the UNCC.
39
 In 1998, the prospect of the 
UNCC actually paying out large claims was not promising and “still 
very much a question mark.”
40
 In this first five-year period, when Iraq 
declined to cooperate,
41
 funds available for compensation came only 
from liquidated, foreign-held Iraqi assets, voluntary contributions, and 
loans by states.
42
 In April 1995, UNSC Resolution 986 established the 
so-called Oil-For-Food program that allowed billions of dollars in Iraqi 
oil sales every six months, but Iraq declined to cooperate and actually 
make such sales until December 1996.
43
 The UNSC set ceilings on 
Iraq’s oil sales revenues: first $2 billion, then $5.2 billion, then $3 
billion, and then final removal of the ceiling altogether in 1999 under 
 
supra note 33 (contending that the “A” claims awards solely for departures represented a 
“jurisdictional landmark”). 
 35. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 17. 
 36. S.C. Res. 705, ¶ 2 (Aug. 15, 1991). 
 37. John R. Crook, Mass Claims Processes: Lessons Learned Over Twenty-Five Years, in 
REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO 
UNIQUE CHALLENGES 41, 57 (Permanent Court of Arbitration ed., 2006) (noting that the UNCC 
was operational for several years before Iraq began to participate in the UN Oil-For-Food 
program in 1996, which assured “a secure source of funding”). 
 38. See generally Townsend, supra note 3, at 1012-13. 
 39. Ronald J. Bettauer, Policy Issues Surrounding the Creation and Operations of the 
UNCC, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 3, 6.  
 40. Ulmer, supra note 32, at 7-8. 
 41. See Andrea Gattini, The UN Compensation Commission: Old Rules, New Procedures on 
War Reparations, 13 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 161, 181 (2002). 
 42. Hans van Houtte, Hans Das & Bart Delmartino, The United Nations Compensation 
Commission, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 364 (Pablo de Greif ed., 2006). 
 43. Id. 
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UNSC Resolution 1284.
44
 In 2000, under UNSC Resolution 1330—
reacting to the controversy generated by the UNCC’s massive award to 
the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation—the UNSC reduced the level of 
Iraq’s compensation contribution from 30% to 25%.
45
 Between 1996 
and 2003, Iraqi oil sales totaled $65 billion, thus yielding more than $15 
billion for the UNCC compensation fund.
46
 Following the Second Gulf 
War in Iraq, UNSC Resolution 1483 (2003) reduced the percentage of 
the oil revenue paid by Iraq into the UNCC compensation fund from 
25% to 5% of oil revenues (and disentangled compensation from 
sanctions).
47
 This led to reduced funding, leading the UNCC to reduce 
the amount it paid out annually in compensation.
48
 UNSC Resolution 
1956 (2010) affirmed the 5% of oil proceeds figure,
49
 but starting in 
December 2014, after considering Iraq’s request for relief based on  “the 
extraordinarily difficult security circumstances in Iraq and the unusual 
budgetary challenges,” the UNCC Governing Council postponed all 
Iraqi payments until 2016,
50
 then until 2017,
51
 and then until 2018.
52
 In 
November 2017, Iraq proposed to resume graduated payments of oil 
proceeds into the compensation fund—namely 0.5% in 2018, 1.5% in 
2019, and 3% from 2020—and, significantly, continue until the last 
outstanding award is paid in full (which is anticipated by the end of 
2021).
53
 
Reductions and postponements in the payments of Iraqi oil 
proceeds have significantly prolonged the life span of the UNCC. The 
compromises resulting in extensions meant that, over time, all claims 
 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 366; see also Mojtaba Kazazi, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and 
Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 333, 333-34 (2005) 
[hereinafter Kazazi]. 
 46. van Houtte, et al, supra note 42, at 364. 
 47. Id. at 376. 
 48. Id. at 376-77.   
 49. Id. at 375. 
 50. U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 272, U.N. Doc S/AC.26/Dec.272 
(Dec. 18, 2014). 
 51. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 273, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/Dec.273 (Oct. 28, 2015). 
 52. U.N Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 274, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.274 
(Nov. 3, 2016). 
 53. U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing Council Dec. 276, U.N. Doc. 
S/AC.26/Dec.276 (Nov. 21, 2017); see Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, Governing 
Council of United Nations Compensation Commission Concludes Its Eighty-Fifth Session, U.N. 
Doc. PR/2018/7 (Nov. 7, 2018). 
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could be paid out. The international community’s political will was 
essential in securing funding for the UNCC.
54
 
As of January 2019, the UNCC has paid out $48.1 billion, leaving 
only $4.3 billion to be paid on an award decided in 2000 for $14.7 
billion for the Kuwait Petroleum Corporation, which is the UNCC’s last 
outstanding award.
55
 I therefore expect that the UNCC could close 
definitively in 2021 after paying $52.4 billion in awards over the course 
of thirty years. 
Before the Second Gulf War, in 2002, commentators, foreseeing 
greater Iraqi intransigence on paying compensation and growing 
political opposition to UN sanctions (with which the UNCC was often 
conflated), had explained the difference between the compensation and 
sanctions regimes and anticipated that the international community 
might consider “debt relief” for Iraq that would effectively ending the 
UNCC.
56
 
Initially, “Iraq denounced the UNCC repeatedly. [After the Second 
Persian Gulf War that saw the “U.S.-led coalition” invade Iraq and 
depose Saddam Hussein, the new government] became more 
cooperative.”
57
 The new Iraqi government was willing to work with the 
UNCC, though this was years after the establishment of the UNCC.
58
 
B. Payment of Interest 
My 1995 comment recalled that the UNCC issued a decision early 
on to include interest owed on awards, as accrued from the date of the 
loss to the date of payment, but the Governing Council was split at that 
time as to the lawfulness of such interest payments under international 
law and was unable to fix an interest rate.
59
 Iraq had also formally 
objected to being liable for interest.
60
 Paying interest seemed to me to be 
a potential ‘straw that breaks the camel’s back,’ because any delay in 
 
 54. Fred Wooldridge & Olufemi Elias, Humanitarian Considerations in the Work of the 
United Nations Compensation Commission, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 555, 579 (2003). 
 55. Press Release, U.N. Doc. PR/2019/1, supra note 18. 
 56. David D. Caron & Brian Morris, The UN Compensation Commission: Practical Justice, 
not Retribution, 13 Eur. J. Int’l L.183, 199 (2002). 
 57. Lea Brilmayer, Understanding IMCCs: Compensation and Closure in the Formation 
and Function of Intentional Mass Claims Commissions, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 273, 298 (2018). 
 58. Cymie R. Payne, Legal Liability or Environmental Damage: The United Nations 
Compensation Commission and the 1990-1991 Gulf War, in GOVERNANCE, NATURAL 
RESOURCES, AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 719, 735 (Carl Bruch, et al. eds., 1st ed. 
2016). 
 59. Townsend, supra note 3, at 994-95. 
 60. Id. 
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settling claims would mean accrual of significant amounts of interest 
owed, particularly in light of the lack of adequate funds to even pay the 
principal amount of claims awards.
61
 In March 2005, with Iraq still 
objecting to paying interest, the Governing Council “finally decided not 
to follow up on this issue, which meant not awarding interest, 
[considering] in particular the unavailability of adequate funds and the 
imminent completion of the Compensation Commission’s claims 
processing program.”
62
 On this point, the Governing Council’s prudent 
decision in 2005 belatedly coincided with my analysis. 
While the UNCC effectively “finished its work and closed its 
doors in 2005,”
63
 with Commissioners having completed their work in 
panels making recommendations on claims the “UNCC itself is still in 
operation to correct duplicate awards and to make additional [and 
eventually in 2021, final] payments.”
64
 Since 2013, the UNCC has been 
awarding compensation in tranches for the one outstanding claim.
65
 
Depending on Iraqi oil sales, final payment on this one outstanding 
claim should occur in 2021. 
 
 61. Id. at 995. 
 62. Dra en Petrovi , The UN Compensation Commission, in THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 849, 857 (James Crawford, et al. eds., 2010); see U.N. Compensation Comm’n, 
Governing Council Dec. 243, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/Dec.243 (Mar. 10, 2005); John Lonsberg, 
Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and Future International Claims Practice, 99 AM. 
SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 332, 336 (2005) (pointing out that had the UNCC decided from the start 
not to award interest on claims, claimants would have saved much unnecessary “time and work” 
calculating such interest). 
 63. Brilmayer, supra note 57, at 295. 
 64. Arturo J. Carrillo & Jason S. Palmer, Transnational Mass Claim Processes (TMCPs) in 
International Law and Practice, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 343, 372 (2010). 
 65. See e.g. Press Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation 
Commission Pays Out US $90 Million, U.N. Press Release PR/2018/5 (Oct. 23, 2018) (noting 
recent payment of US $90 million towards the last claim); Press Release, U.N. Compensation 
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.13 Billion, U.N. Doc. 
PR/2013/3 (Apr. 25, 2013) (noting only one claim remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation 
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.09 Billion, U.N. Doc. 
PR/2012/6 (Oct. 25, 2012) (noting only two claims remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation 
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1.3 Billion, U.N. Doc 
PR/2012/5 (July 26, 2012) (noting only six claims remained); Press Release, U.N. Compensation 
Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US $1,038,375,281 Billion, U.N. 
Doc. PR/2011/8 (Oct. 27, 2011) (noting only eight claims remained); Press Release, U.N. 
Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US 
$1,059,048,547, U.N. Doc. PR/2011/5 (July 28, 2011) (noting only nine claims remained); Press 
Release, U.N. Compensation Comm’n, United Nations Compensation Commission Pays Out US 
$674.2 million, U.N. Doc. PR/2010/1 (Jan. 28, 2010) (noting only ten claims remained); see 
generally Press Releases 2014-2019, United Nations Compensation Comm’n, 
https://uncc.ch/2014-2019 (last visited Jan. 21, 2019). 
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IV. ASSESSMENT OF UNCC IN ITS 27TH YEAR OF 30 
My 1995 comment outlined precedent that the UNCC had 
established by then.
66
 In subsequent years, the UNCC proved to be 
innovative and sought to be fast but fair. The UNCC’s innovations 
included: prioritizing claims of individuals (over corporate and 
governmental claims); using computing tools; categorizing claims; 
tailoring evidentiary requirements and standards per category; making 
awards for environmental damage; providing experts to assist Iraq to 
challenge claims; and affording more due process to Iraq over time.
67
 
Other observers have also noted the UNCC’s “rich treasury of 
jurisprudence” particularly on “causation and valuation issues on 
contractual and non-contractual losses.”
68
 
A. Fast but Fair? 
A successful claims settlement mechanism must render correct 
decisions and act fairly towards the parties without undue delay.
69
 Those 
who created the UNCC faced two institutional design challenges: 
making a claims system that was fast but fair, and dividing 
proportionally an “inadequate pie” among claimants.
70
 A third 
challenge—that of handling claims for damage to the environment—
was looming further down the road.
71
 Caron, analyzing the UNCC in 
retrospect, described the institution as having faced two broad stages: 
the first where it quickly processed about 2.5 million mass claims (for 
categories “A” to “C”),
72
 and the second stage (for categories “D” to 
“F”) requiring a shift to individualized case review, holding oral 
proceedings, inviting more Iraqi participation, conducting site visits, 
 
 66. Townsend, supra note 3, at 999-1006. 
 67. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15-16. 
 68. Carver, supra note 10, at 326; Kazazi, supra note 45, at 331-32. 
 69. Crook, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that the UNCC “was marked throughout by a 
recurring tension between the needs for accuracy and fundamental fairness, and for timely claims 
processing at acceptable cost”). 
 70. David D. Caron, The United Nations Compensation Commission: Understanding an 
Institution and the Three Phases of Its Work, Introduction, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, 
at xxvii. 
 71. Id.   
 72. Michael Raboin, UNCC Origin, Structure, and Operations, Summary of Remarks, 99 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 327 (2005) (noting that the UNCC “spent most of the first five years 
concentrating on these humanitarian claims. This was partly because we had not real funds to 
operate beyond these categories”). 
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and raising evidentiary requirements.
73
 Caron attributed the UNCC’s 
speed in the first stage to the key decisions it took in setting fixed 
amounts for categories of claims,
74
 standardizing the evidence required 
to prove a claim, and using computers to cross-check claims against 
databases (airline registers, for example).
75
 Interestingly, Caron 
remarked that the UNCC at this stage “was trying not to think only like 
a lawyer.”
76
 One lawyer that represented Kuwait suggested, however, 
that the UNCC was “unduly strict” in its rejection of claims lacking 
documentation because it failed to appreciate that Kuwaiti ministries 
had “suffered massive destruction during the [Iraqi] invasion.”
77
 
B. Priority Given to Claims of Individuals 
The UNCC’s paying out of claims to individuals on an urgent 
basis, accepting late claims, compensating the costs of charitable relief 
provided to refugees, and limiting the administrative fees governments 
could charge claimants were due to “humanitarian” considerations and 
benefited more than a million individuals, mostly workers from Egypt, 
Jordan, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and the Philippines.
78
 
This prioritization also reflected the UNCC’s expectation that funding 
for all compensation might run out. Claimants in categories “A” to “C” 
were largely successful as the UNCC awarded 93, 67 and 57% of the 
 
 73. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxi-xxxiv; Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 
17, at 12 (noting that the UNCC used a “multi-speed regime for evidence”); Rajesh Singh, 
Raising the Stakes: Evidentiary Issues in Individual Claims Before the United Nations 
Compensation Commission, in The Int’l Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (ed.), 
REDRESSING INJUSTICES THROUGH MASS CLAIMS PROCESSES: INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO 
UNIQUE CHALLENGES (2006) 61, at 93 (noting the UNCC “effectively used a sliding scale 
approach to evidential burdens”); see id. at 62 (noting that the evidential burden was lower for 
smaller claims and it was higher for bigger claims); see id. (noting the UNCC did not change the 
legal standard of proof of “balance of probabilities,” but relaxed the evidence required to “simple 
documentation” for “A” and “B” individual claimants); see id. at 73 (individual claimants 
represented 99.7% of all claims before the UNCC); see also U.N. Compensation Commission 
Governing Council Dec. 10, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/1992/10, Provisional Rules for Claims 
Procedures, art. 35(2)(a) and (b) (June 26, 1992) (relating to “Evidence” and establishing the 
requirement of “simple documentation”). 
 74. Arif H. Ali & Marguerite C. Walter, Principles of Valuation Taken from the UNCC 
Perspective, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 81, 101 (noting the UNCC’s instructive 
“valuation jurisprudence”). 
 75. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxii. 
 76. Id. 
 77. John Lonsberg, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 328-29 (2005). 
 78. Wooldridge & Elias, supra note 54, at 555, 564, 569-70, 577 (2003). 
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amount claimed, respectively, while the average success rate for 
corporate and government claims, as of 2003, was only 16%.
79
 
C. A Sizable Institution that Applied Innovative Tools 
The UNCC’s mass claims processing relied heavily on the support 
of a substantial secretariat and the “use of modern information 
technology.”
80
 The secretariat had as many as three hundred staff 
members.
81
 As Caron put it, the UNCC secretariat “arguably became, in 
some respects, the most influential organ.”
82
 The UNCC ran “seventeen 
separate claims programs, with nineteen panels of three commissioners 
each.”
83
 Commissioners had six months to decide claims, or twelve 
months if the claims were large and complex.
84
 Usually, the UNCC 
Governing Council quickly approved the panel’s recommendations and 
awards—as it viewed its role as not one of close scrutiny but checking 
“only for basic consistency with the claims criteria”—and only rarely 
 
 79. Id. at 578-79.   
 80. Heike Niebergall, Overcoming Evidentiary Weakness in Reparation Claims 
Programmes in Carla Ferstman, Mariana Goetz & Alan Stephens (eds.), REPARATIONS FOR 
VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY, SYSTEMS IN PLACE 
AND SYSTEMS IN THE MAKING 145, 148 (2009) [hereinafter SYSTEMS]. 
 81. INT’L MASS CLAIMS PROCESS: LEGAL AND PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVES (Howard M. 
Holtzmann & Edda Kristjánsdóttir (eds., 2007) 302 (noting “[a]t its height, it had at one time 
approximately three hundred professional and general service staff in Geneva, Switzerland. These 
included legal staff, accountants, loss adjusters, statisticians, information technology specialists, 
and administrative support staff from a number of different countries”); id. (noting the Secretariat 
was organized into: (i) the Office of the Executive Secretary; (ii) the Claims Processing Division, 
consisting of legal services branch, support for verification and valuation of claims, and a claims 
registry; (iii) the Support Services Division, whose functions include payment of claims and the 
administration of the Compensation Fund, and information section; (iv) the Executive Offices, as 
part of the Support Services Division, responsible for personnel and budgetary matters, and; (v) 
the Governing Council Secretariat). Up to 2005, the Secretariat “employed 206 lawyers 
throughout its existence.” Raboin, supra note 72, at 328. 
 82. Caron, supra note 70, at xxx. 
 83. Raboin, supra note 72, at 327-28. 
 84. John P. Gaffney, The United Nations Compensation Commission: A Structural and 
Procedural Overview, 65 ARBITRATION: JOURNAL OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF 
ARBITRATORS 214 (1999); see also Robert C. O’Brien, Government and International 
Organization Claims Precedential Claims by Governments for Damage to Diplomatic Property 
and Related Losses, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 329, 358 (noting “[t]his judicious 
use of the designation [“large and complex” for claims] allowed the panels much-needed time to 
evaluate and settle the F1 claims, as well as to invite greater participation from both the claimants 
and Iraq”). 
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did it delay approval or seek clarifications.
85
 The UNCC budget was 
approximately $41 to $50 million per year.
86
 
The UNCC’s processing innovations lead to efficiencies by: 
requiring computerized submission; requiring (and distributing to 
States) a standardized claim form; and designing a database to receive, 
organize, and provide access to the entirety of the claim information.
87
 
The UNCC also applied a “two-stage process: a precedent-setting phase 
[on representative claims, decided by panels] and an application phase” 
in which the secretariat staff “applied the decisions to the [groupings of] 
remaining similar claims.”
88
 The UNCC took this model from category 
“A” claims and expanded it to subsequent claims categories.
89
 These 
“innovative methods” serve as a model for future claims procedure and 
institutions.
90
 
D. Environmental Claims 
With respect to environmental claims, the UNCC’s decisions have 
“significantly contributed . . . to the development of international 
environmental law.”
91
 
In 1990–1991, during the First Gulf War, retreating Iraqi soldiers 
set alight more than six hundred oil wells and dumped millions of 
gallons of oil into the sea in the Persian Gulf. Natural resources thus 
served as the pretext for war, and as instruments for victims of 
aggression.
92
 The UNCC’s compensation for such environmental 
damage represented a precedent (as indicated in my comment).
93
 
Moreover commentators view its handling of environmental 
compensation as relatively speedy, efficient (especially when compared 
 
 85. Ronald Bettauer, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 331 (2005); but 
see Kazazi, supra note 45, at 333-34 (noting that in 2000 the UNCC Governing Council took a 
few months of political consultations and reached a “compromise” to approve the $15.9 billion 
award to the Kuwait Petroleum Company on its E1 claim but consider enhancing Iraq’s 
participation, and that payment of pending claims “is more subject to political circumstances”). 
 86. See van Houtte, et al, supra note 42, at 370. 
 87. Norbert Wühler, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 329, 338 (2005). 
 88. Id. at 329-30. 
 89. Id. at 329. 
 90. Jean-Christophe Martin, La pratique de la Commission d’indemnisation des Nations 
Unies pour l’I    en m t   e  e    l m t on  env  onnement le  [The practice of the United 
Nations Compensation Commission for Iraq in environmental claims], in LE DROIT 
INTERNATIONAL FACE AUX ENJEUX ENVIRONNEMENTAUX 257, 273 (A. Pedone ed., 2010). 
 91. Id.   
 92. Payne, supra note 58, at 719. 
 93. Townsend, supra note 3, 993. 
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to domestic cases like that of the Exxon Valdez oil spill that took twenty 
years), and successful, particularly in its tracking, monitoring and 
assessing environmental damage.
94
 Commentators note that the UNCC’s 
granting awards for monitoring and assessment (effectively studies and 
surveys to impute environmental damage to the Gulf War) was 
innovative as it represented “the first time in the history of claims 
commissions that costs incurred in collecting the evidence necessary for 
the submission of claims were deemed compensable.”
95
 Equally 
innovative was the UNCC’s compulsory follow-up tracking that 
ensured claimants spent award payments on the agreed, remedial 
environmental objectives.
96
 
On environmental claims, Caron observed that the UNCC made a 
mistake in not prioritizing them early on and in waiting until 1998 to 
address them, because state agencies could have mitigated more 
environmental damage if awarded compensation earlier.
97
 Nevertheless, 
Caron assessed the UNCC panel handling these complex environmental 
claims as having made a positive and remarkable shift by ordering the 
use of monitoring and assessment activities to protect the environment, 
and suggesting reasonable projects funded by awards to ameliorate the 
environment.
98
 This was also an innovative approach. 
E. Affording Greater Due Process Over Time 
Proceedings before the UNCC were purportedly inquisitorial 
rather than adversarial in nature.
99
 Some even argue the UNCC process, 
like the UNSC, was inherently political.
100
 What is telling about the 
 
 94. Payne, supra note 58, at 746. 
 95. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 13-14; Carver, supra note 10, at 
326 (noting that “Iraq paid for all of the UNCC’s operations and even, in the case of the 
environmental claims, for work done by claimants to determine whether a claim existed at all”); 
Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks: Part 1: UNCC Origin, Structure, and Operations, 99 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 330 (2005) (noting that for the F4 claims, “Iraq even funded 
monitoring and assessment programs to assist claimants in identifying the existence and extent of 
claims!”). 
 96. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 14; see also Martin, supra note 
90, at 257. 
 97. Caron, supra note 70, at xxxiii-xxxv. 
 98. Id. at xxxvi-xxxvii; see also Peter H. Sand, Compensation for Environmental Damage 
from the 1991 Gulf War, in LAW OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND ARMED CONFLICT 318-23 (Karen 
Hulme ed., 2017). 
 99. See Wooldridge & Elias, supra note 54, at 557. 
 100. Lalanath de Silva, Reflections on the United Nations Compensation Experience, in 
GOVERNANCE, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND POST-CONFLICT PEACEBUILDING 761-62 (Carl 
Bruch, Carroll Muffett & Sandra S. Nichols eds., 2016) (contending that “[t]he United States and 
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UNCC is that its panels over time, after starting with an early debate on 
Iraq’s lack of standing or right to “defend” itself,
101
 invited 
progressively more Iraqi participation in the proceedings. This 
participation varied from receiving submissions on claims, holding oral 
proceedings, hearing from Iraqi representatives, and appointing counsel 
to support Iraq to afford it greater due process as was appropriate to the 
various categories of claims.
102
 
In its early years, observers criticized the UNCC for what they 
perceived as a lack of due process and pointed out that in the UNCC 
process, “Iraq is not given the right to be heard as a defendant. Much 
worse, Iraq does not have the right to dispose of its own funds to avail 
itself of the very limited opportunities for comments that it has in these 
proceedings.”
103
 At the request of the United States (which wanted to 
avoid delaying, procedural tactics), the UNSC established the UNCC to 
be administrative (not judicial) in nature and greatly limited Iraqi 
participation from the start; most proceedings were virtually ex parte.
104
 
The UNCC transmitted only large and complex claims “to Iraq for 
comments.”
105
 Oral hearings before the UNCC were relatively rare, and 
when “hearings were held, representatives of Iraq were allowed to 
attend for purposes of answering questions put by the 
Commissioners.”
106
 
 
other Western powers, including the United Kingdom, played a major role in the 1990-1991 Gulf 
War. There is ample material to support the view that the UNCC’s rules and claims outcomes, 
including the environmental claim outcomes, were influenced by these political dynamics”). 
 101. THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: A HANDBOOK 15 (Marco Frigessi 
di Rattalma & Tullio Treves eds., 1999); id. at n.36 (noting that article 36 of the UNCC 
Provisional Rules also allowed panels to invite any government, including Iraq, to present its 
views in oral proceedings). 
 102. Timothy J. Feighery, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in THE RULES, 
PRACTICE, AND JURISPRUDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 525 (Chiara 
Giorgetti ed., 2012). 
 103. Michael E. Schneider, How Fair and Efficient is the UNCC System? A Model to 
Emulate?, 15(1) J. INT’L ARB 1 (1998); see John R. Crook, The UNCC and its Critics: Is Iraq 
Entitled to Due Process, in THE UNITED NATIONS COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH 
SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 95 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995). 
 104. See Meltzer, supra note 8, at 533; Ronald J. Bettauer, Establishment of the United 
Nations Compensation Commission: The U.S. Government Perspective, in THE UNITED NATIONS 
COMPENSATION COMMISSION: THIRTEENTH SOKOL COLLOQUIUM 29 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 
1995); Danio Campanelli, The United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC): Reflections 
on Its Judicial Character, 4 LAW & PRAC. INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 107, 125 (2005); Robert C. 
O’Brien, The Challenge of Verifying Corporate and Government Claims at the United Nations 
Compensation Commission, 31 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 1, 28 (1998) (arguing that permitting Iraq a 
larger role in the proceedings risked causing “serious delays”). 
 105. INT’L. MASS CLAIMS PROCESS, supra note 81, at 267. 
 106. Id. at 233.   
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The Governing Council, after some cajoling,
107
 decided in 2001 to 
permit Iraq to submit its views and “benefit from the assistance of 
experts for preparing its comments,”
108
 the cost of which the UNCC 
bore.
109
 For environmental (“F4”) claims, the UNCC permitted greater 
Iraqi participation because these claims were complex and legally 
novel. After overcoming the UNCC’s administrative hurdles, Iraq 
retained and relied upon a sizable legal, technical and scientific team, 
just in time for the second and subsequent instalments of the 
environmental claims.
110
 Iraq “seized this opportunity and took a very 
active part in the proceedings, defending its interests in a constructive 
manner and assisting, within the limits of its possibilities, the panel in 
its search for a fair and just outcome to the extent to which the system 
allowed such an outcome.”
111
 
The UNCC thus evolved over time and afforded Iraq 
“participatory space” in the claims process with respect to large 
environmental claims, “similar to that of a defendant in a civil suit or 
party to an arbitration.”
112
 Key political actors in the UNCC influenced 
this evolution.
113
 The panel (and its legal team under the secretariat) 
deciding the third to the fifth instalments of the environmental claims 
“consistently supported expanding Iraq’s” participation to clarify issues 
and bolster the credibility and legitimacy of the panel’s decisions.
114
 In 
 
 107. Kazazi, supra note 45, at 334 (noting a 2001 political compromise that saw the: (1) 
UNCC Governing Council agree to consider enhancing Iraqi participation; (2) the UNCC 
Governing Council award $15.9 billion to the Kuwait Petroleum Company; and (3) the UNSC 
reduce Iraq’s contribution to compensation from 30 to 25%. Iraq had requested expanded 
representation at least five years earlier); see Bhushan Bahree, Iraq Stakes Claim to Funds 
Earmarked for Compensation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, (Eur. Ed.), at 2 (reporting that the Iraqi 
government states that it needs UNCC funds pay for its “legal defense” against compensation 
claims). 
 108. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 11; U.N. Compensation 
Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 124, U.N. Doc. S/AC.26/2001/124, annex (June 19, 2001) 
(“arrangement to provide technical assistance to Iraq in respect of environmental claims before 
the UNCC”) (permitting Iraq to select experts “freely,” seeking a “full range of views,” 
authorizing $3 to $5 million US dollars for such experts to be paid directly by the UNCC, and 
noting that this arrangement “cannot be construed as a precedent … [nor does it] create any 
changes to the Rules.”); see also U.N. Compensation Comm’n Governing Council Dec. 114, U.N. 
Doc. S/AC.26/Dec. 114 (Dec. 7, 2000), ¶ 22 (discussing “technical assistance” to Iraq). 
 109. Kazazi, supra note 45, at 334 (noting that altogether the UNCC provided Iraq with $14 
million “in technical assistance to defend the environmental claims”). 
 110. Michael E. Schneider, The Role of Iraq in the UNCC Process with Special Emphasis on 
the Environmental Claims, in WAR REPARATIONS, supra note 33, at 135, 156-59.  
 111. Id. at 135. 
 112. De Silva, supra note 100, at 761-62. 
 113. Id. at 762.   
 114. Id. at 762-63. 
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the third to fifth instalments of the environmental claims, the UNCC 
had greatly expanded “due process” procedures for Iraq (beyond the 
initially granted right to file reports and access to basic claims 
materials) including: (1) responding in writing to claims; (2) granting 
extensions to Iraq; (3) affording legal and technical aid to Iraq from 
UNCC funds; (4) allowing requests for documents by counsel for Iraq; 
(5) disclosing monitoring and assessing material to Iraq; (6) providing 
to Iraq the responses to interrogatories submitted by claimants; (7) 
meeting with the panel’s experts; and (8) holding more extensive oral 
hearings. The UNCC, however, did not afford Iraq an opportunity to 
participate in on-site inspections.
115
 To “Iraq’s credit,” it adopted a 
“cooperative strategy” to “help the panel reach the right decision” when 
the UNCC afforded it technical assistance that fostered wider Iraqi 
participation in the process.
116
 
F. The UNSC’  Dete m n t on of St te Re pon  b l ty to P y 
Compensation 
Though it represented an innovation in New York (and not in 
Geneva, the seat of the UNCC), from a legal standpoint, it is important 
to mention that the UNSC’s establishing of Iraqi liability still remains 
an important precedent under the law of state responsibility.
117
 The 
efficiency and effectiveness of the UNCC rested on this foundation, 
forged from UNSC concerted action at the time. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The UNCC was as exceptional as was the UNSC’s extraordinary 
enforcement action in the 1991 Gulf War, and arose in “a very 
particular historical and political context.”
118
 In the future, the UN may 
be called upon to establish and oversee a regime for compensation, and 
such a regime would benefit from understanding the UNCC’s 
innovations and lessons learned. 
 
 115. Id. at 764.   
 116. Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks: Part 2: The UNCC and Future International 
Claims Practice, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 335 (2005). 
 117. Townsend, supra note 3, 1002-3; see generally ALEXANDROS KOLLIOPOULOUS, LA 
COMMISSION D’INDEMNISATION DES NATIONS UNIES ET LE DROIT DE LA RESPONSABI IT  
INTERNATIONALE [THE U.N. COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY] 247-446 (2001). 
 118. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15. 
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Despite early critics describing the UNCC as a “completely 
misconceived [model that] should be discarded as soon as possible,”
119
 I 
would beg to differ as do the overwhelming majority of commentators 
that deem the UNCC to be a success.
120
 As one commentator noted in 
2005, after “14 years of effective work,” no one can doubt now the 
UNCC’s authority or legitimacy.
121
 
The UNCC achieved its goal of deciding voluminous (2.7 million) 
claims—the highest in the history of claims commissions
122
—in a “fair 
and efficient manner” in less than fifteen years.
123
 The “sheer volume of 
its work, and the fact that this work was completed in such a relatively 
short time, make the UNCC a unique success story as a post-conflict 
claims resolution mechanism.”
124
 In sum, Feighery attributes its success 
to its innovative design, flexible approaches, use of information 
technology, and the skill of its commissioners.
125
 
Following the UNCC, other mass claim settlement mechanisms for 
victims of armed conflict benefitted from the model set by the UNCC, 
including the Commission for Real Property Claims in Bosnia, the 
Housing and Property Claims Commission in Kosovo, and the Claims 
Resolution Tribunal for Dormant Accounts in Switzerland.
126
 The 
UNCC also may have served as inspiration for a proposed UN fund to 
compensate victims of terrorist acts.
127
 One academic even posits that 
the international community should go even further and set up an 
international court of civil justice.
128
 In any case, the UNCC certainly set 
a new standard for post-conflict compensation institutions.
129
 
 
 119. Schneider, supra note 103, at 12; id. at 8, 12 (contending the UNCC process violated 
Iraqi sovereignty, amounted to “victor’s justice” because the relevant UNSC resolutions never 
“have been accepted by Iraq” and should have been based on model of consensual arbitration); 
see also Michael Schneider, Summary of Remarks, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L. L. PROC. 330 (2005) 
(describing the UNCC as a “disgrace”). 
 120. See e.g. Carver, supra note 10, at 325; Wühler, supra note 87, at 338. 
 121. Bettauer, supra note 85, at 337-38. 
 122. Boisson de Chazournes & Campanelli, supra note 17, at 15. 
 123. Linda A. Taylor, The United Nations Compensation Commission, in SYSTEMS, supra 
note 80, at 197, 213. 
 124. Feighery, supra note 102, at 515. 
 125. Id. at 515-16. 
 126. See van Houtte, et al., supra note 42, at 369, n.185. 
 127. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 10 (Oct. 8, 2004) (requesting consideration “of establishing an 
international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families”); see generally 
Crook, supra note 37, at 57. 
 128. See generally, MAYA STEINITZ, THE CASE FOR AN INTERNATIONAL COURT OF CIVIL 
JUSTICE (2018); Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 75 (2014). 
 129. See Campanelli, supra note 104, at 139. 
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The success of the UNCC is partially attributable to the relative 
consensus within the UNSC that characterized the years of the UNCC’s 
operation. “We can be grateful that the [international] political 
dynamics in 1991 allowed for the UNCC’s creation and its ensuring 
success for the practical application of state responsibility principles.”
130
 
One knowledgeable observer recently stated that the positive political 
context that facilitated the establishment and success of the UNCC was 
one that only occurs “once in a generation.”
131
 
 
 
 130. Bettauer, supra note 85, at 338. 
 131. Telephone interview with Veijo Heiskanen, Jan. 16, 2019. 
